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I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent events harmonically converged into the topic for 
this article. The first was a posting on Georgetown Law’s environ-
mental law professors’ listserv by Professor John Bonine, which 
raised a number of questions about whether and how standing doc-
trine might be rethought in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.1 That opinion relaxed the states’ standing 
burden because of the unique sovereign interests, finding that fe-
deralism bargaining earned states “special solicitude”2 when it 
came to meeting the Court’s standing requirements.   
* Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and Director of the Insti-
tute for Public Representation.  The author is grateful to the faculty at Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law for inviting me to present these ideas at their annual Journal of 
Land Use & Environmental Law Distinguished Lecturer Series and for their insightful 
comments on my lecture.  I am also indebted to Jamie G. Pleune, a graduate teaching fellow 
and staff attorney at the Institute for Representation, for her wise comments on an earlier 
draft of this article and to Angela Navarro for her careful edits.  The lecture has been re-
vised slightly since it was delivered in February of this year to reflect the fact that it is now 
appearing in written, not spoken form. It has also been updated to incorporate the FSU 
faculty comments as well as the effect of a recent U.S. Supreme Court standing decision, 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009). 
1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2. Id. at 520 (“[M]assachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests . . . 
entitled [it] to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”).  
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The second was a complaint filed by a consortium of regional 
environmental organizations, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 
and individuals against the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) for failing to achieve the goals of the Chesapeake Bay 
Agreements.3 EPA is one of five signatories to the Agreements, 
which contains a variety of goals, deadlines, and recommended ac-
tions, and which has failed miserably to halt the Chesapeake Bay’s 
decline.4 This complaint led to a reflection on work done in the 
clinic several years ago, where bringing a lawsuit on behalf of a 
commercial fisherman challenging the practice of chumming on 
the Bay was thought about long and hard. Chumming involves de-
positing a slurry of decomposed fish parts, usually menhaden, over 
the side of a fishing boat to attract game fish like striped bass.5
While chumming contributes to the Bay’s nutrification, by itself it 
has little discernible impact on the Bay’s overall health given the 
much larger sources of nutrients like sewage treatment plants, ru-
noff from farm fields, and confined animal feeding operations.6 Ul-
timately it was determined, in part on standing grounds, that such 
a lawsuit could not succeed. 
The last event was a recent conversation with a retired Wash-
ington attorney about his decision to start a new organization that 
would supply pro bono assistance to property owners concerned 
about relatively discrete, highly localized harms to the Bay such as 
leaking septic systems or permit violations by industrial discharg-
ers. Collectively, these separate events congealed into a somewhat 
amorphous concern about the extent to which the Supreme Court’s 
standing jurisprudence and its insistence on a showing of a parti-
cularized injury-in-fact are ill-suited to the types of broad-based, 
generalized harms from which complex, constantly changing eco-
systems suffer.   
The new lawsuit against EPA mentioned above, as well as the 
contemplated, but never filed, chumming lawsuit, would likely fail 
to meet current standing requirements because plaintiffs would be 
unable to disaggregate the harm they suffered from the more ge-
neralized harms that the public suffers as a result of the Bay’s de-
3. Complaint at 2, Fowler v. EPA, No. 1:2009CV00005 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2009).  
4. See Jeff Day, Chesapeake Bay: Bay’s Health Remains Poor After 25 Years; Officials 
Say ‘Bolder’ Initiatives Under Way, 40 ENV’T REP. 707, 707 (Mar. 27, 2009) (reporting that 
25 years after the creation of the Chesapeake Bay Program, the percentage of dissolved 
oxygen in the water, which is a key indicator of the health of the Bay, is virtually un-
changed from what it was in 1985). 
5.  For more information on the practice of chumming and its adverse effects on wa-
ter quality, see generally Hope M. Babcock, Administering the Clean Water Act:  Do Regula-
tors Have “Bigger Fish to Fry” When it Comes to Addressing the Practice of Chumming on 
the Chesapeake Bay?, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007). 
6. Id.
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cline. While the approach of the well-meaning, retired Washington 
attorney is less problematic from a standing perspective, his abili-
ty to address the larger systemic problems facing the Bay is un-
clear. Collectively, the three events resulted in a new thought 
about how the Court’s standing jurisprudence has driven environ-
mental litigation to a less effective piecemeal approach to protect-
ing complex natural systems like estuaries. 
Far from being an enabler of what leads to critically important 
environmental litigation, the Court’s requirement that litigants 
show a particularized injury can derail this litigation before the 
merits of such claims can even be considered.7 The requirement 
can drive both plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges into paroxysms of 
tangential work often with contradictory outcomes. And while 
there is much to praise about the Court’s standing analysis in 
Massachusetts, it did not eliminate the need for the Common-
wealth to show it had suffered a particularized injury from both 
the government’s failure to attend to the potentially catastrophic 
harms and from the government’s failure to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from tailpipes.8 The Court’s failure to eliminate  
that need is a great disappointment in what is otherwise a  
glorious opinion. 
This article will attempt to persuade the reader that the 
Court’s insistence that claimants demonstrate a particularized in-
jury does not make sense, even in Massachusetts. This is evident 
considering the claims that arise from broad-based harms to com-
plex, evolving natural systems like estuaries, where the level of 
understanding about how these systems behave is in as much flux 
as the systems themselves. 
The first part of the article describes why it is especially diffi-
cult to particularize the harms to these systems, and why lawsuits 
attacking these problems in a particularized or localist way are not 
doing enough to solve them. The author discusses the Court’s cur-
rent standing jurisprudence, especially the requirement that a 
plaintiff’s injury not only be concrete, but must also be particula-
7. The Court’s recent 5-4 decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct. 
1142 (2009), carries on this tradition. The Court held that environmental organizations who 
had sued the Forest Service for applying its regulations to exempt salvage timber sales on 
238 acres of fire-damaged federal lands from the notice, comment, and appeal process set 
out in the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1612, had 
failed to establish a sufficiently particularized injury to make a facial challenge to the regu-
lations absent their concrete application. Id. at 1147-48, 1149-50.
8. See generally Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than 
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1701, 1747 (2008) (expressing concern about the ambiguity in the majority’s opinion 
on the extent to which Massachusetts could meet traditional standing requirements and  
the extent to which those requirements were modified to reflect the state’s special  
sovereign status).
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rized, in Part II of the article. Part of that discussion includes a 
recitation of the reasons why the Court can, and should, relax the 
requirement to plead particularized injuries from harms for these 
critically important natural systems. The article ends with a de-
scription of some limiting principles to cabin the number and type 
of cases that might be brought under a more relaxed injury-in-fact 
standard. The application of these principles will likely leave the 
Court’s overall standing doctrine intact. 
II. WHY DEMONSTRATING PARTICULARIZED HARMS TO COMPLEX,
EVOLVING NATURAL SYSTEMS IS DIFFICULT AND RESULTS IN 
INEFFECTIVE LAWSUITS
The physically complex and constantly changing nature of eco-
systems, like estuaries, and the breadth of the systemic harms af-
flicting them make it extremely difficult for environmental plain-
tiffs to articulate an injury-in-fact that meets the Court’s particu-
larization standard and, at the same time, addresses these prob-
lems. When plaintiffs can meet the particularization standard, 
their lawsuit will have little effect on broad systemic problems. 
The Chesapeake Bay is used as the platform for this argument be-
cause it is the estuary known best by the author.
The Chesapeake Bay is North America's largest estuary, con-
sisting of 2,500 square miles.9 Its 64,000 square mile drainage area 
includes all or parts of six states and the District of Columbia.10
Approximately sixteen million people live in the Bay’s watershed, 
many of whom rely on the Bay and its tributaries as a source of 
income and as a place to recreate and enjoy the natural environ-
ment.11 The Bay is home to more than 3,700 species of plants and 
animals, including nearly 300 species of fish.12 It offers unique 
commercial and recreational opportunities; prime among these  
is fishing.   
9. The Chesapeake Bay Program calculates that the size of the drainage area creates 
“a watershed land to Bay water volume ratio seven times that of any other major estuary in 
the world[.]” Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay 2005 Health and Restoration As-
sessment, Part One: Ecosystem Health 3 (2005), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/ 
content/publications/cbp_12892.pdf. It is also the longest estuary in the country, with 4000 
miles of shoreline; longer even than the “entire West Coast.” CHRISTOPHER P. WHITE, CHE-
SAPEAKE BAY: NATURE OF THE ESTUARY: A FIELD GUIDE 3 (1989).
10. Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay 2006 Health and Restoration Assess-
ment, Part One: Ecosystem Health 11 (2006), available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/ 
pubs/2007reports/EPA06_BAYHealthReport.pdf.
11. Chesapeake Bay Program: A Watershed Partnership, Facts & Figures, 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/factsandfigures.aspx?menuitem=14582 (last visited Mar.  
15, 2010). 
12. White, supra note 9, at 24. 
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However, despite the investment of millions of dollars in im-
proving the Bay's water quality, the Bay continues to suffer from 
severe environmental degradation. For example, blue crabs, an 
iconic symbol of the Chesapeake Bay, were once at the apex of the 
Bay’s commercial fishery and supplied one-third of the nation’s 
blue crab harvest.13 In slightly less than a decade, the total abun-
dance of crabs in the Bay has declined nearly seventy percent..14
The Bay’s equally important oyster population is at less than 1% of 
its historic numbers.15 Poor water quality from onshore sources of 
nutrients and sediments has been a major factor in the decline of 
these and other Bay fisheries, as well as in the loss of vital Bay 
underwater grasses.16 These grasses serve as critically important 
nursery and spawning areas for many of the Bay’s aquatic species 
and help oxygenate the water so those and other species  
can survive.17   
The Bay offers a challenging environment for its resident spe-
cies as well as for scientists and regulators charged with the task 
of predicting how the system will respond to pollutants and other 
stressors, including natural ones. The Bay’s hydrology and hydro-
dynamic character are extremely complex18 and poorly understood. 
Although the Bay’s wide mouth allows for vigorous tidal flushing, 
turnover of its water is slow; a parcel of water generally takes from 
two to three weeks to cycle along the Bay's 195-mile length.19   
One hundred and fifty tributaries from a wide array of geo-
physical provinces and states drain into the Bay, contributing not 
only freshwater, nutrients, and other important materials for 
plant growth, but also pollutants.20 The tributaries create a mul-
tiplicity of distinct ecological zones in the Bay, and the Bay’s tem-
perature fluctuations and sharp salinity gradient create barriers 
13. Chesapeake Bay Program: A Watershed Partnership, Blue Crab, http://www.chesa 
peakebay.net/bluecrab.aspx?menuitem=19367 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
14. Chesapeake Bay Program, Blue Crab Harvest, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/ 
crabs.aspx?menuitem=14700 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
15. NOAA Chesapeake Bay Office, Native Oysters, http://chesapeakebay.noaa.gov/ 
NativeOysters.aspx (Feb. 29, 2008). 
16. See U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA NEEDS TO BETTER REPORT 
CHESAPEAKE BAY CHALLENGES, SUMMARY REPORT, REP. NO. 08-P-0199 30 (2008) (discuss-
ing the onshore sources of nutrients and sediments and their impact on Chesapeake Bay 
water quality). 
17. White, supra note 9, at 24 (explaining that “[l]ike a pyramid of stones, the animals 
at the top are dependent on the size of the plant base.  Top carnivores such as crabs, blu-
efish, and osprey are very abundant in the Chesapeake only because of the enormous plant 
productivity in the Bay . . . .  The Bay’s various plant communities . . . sustain the nations’ 
most prolific estuarine fisheries.”).
18. V.N. Mikhailov et al., Regularities of Hydrological Processes in the Chesapeake 
Bay (USA): Case Study of a Classical Estuary, 36 WATER RES. 127, 127 (2009). 
19. White, supra note 9, at 18. 
20. Id. at 19-20. 
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many species cannot cross.21 The Bay’s freshwater tributaries, sa-
linity structure, and tidal flow are additionally highly variable.22
The process of trying to understand how stressors like pollu-
tants behave in an estuarine system, like the Bay, is greatly com-
plicated by the phenomenon of positive feedback loops. These 
“complex, circuitous paths”23 are common in fluctuating systems 
like estuaries. A positive feedback loop occurs when the conse-
quences of an ongoing process become factors in modifying or 
changing that process by reinforcing and amplifying it.24 For ex-
ample, the process of nutrification, which involves algal blooms 
that block sunlight from underwater grasses, causing the grasses 
and algae to die, sets off three positive feedback loops that rein-
force and amplify the original process, leading to more die-off.25
The effects of positive feedback loops, which act to speed up the 
original process, are negative because they can destabilize a sys-
tem; in some cases, they even cause the system’s collapse. Revers-
ing the flow of a feedback loop will not allow the component parts 
of a complex, adaptive system like an estuary “simply to retrace 
their steps”26 and to return to where the process started. Rather 
when the process is reversed, “[n]ew feedback loops may emerge, 
the old ones may change strength or direction, and new possibili-
ties for the system open up.”27
Complex systems like estuaries also react to change in unpre-
dictable ways. The smallest changes to such systems can have 
wide-ranging effects.28 This is especially true “in far-from-
equilibrium conditions,” such as those found in the Bay, where 
even the smallest disturbances or changes “can become amplified 
into gigantic, structure-breaking waves.”29 In fact, “the more com-
plex a system is, the more numerous are the types of fluctuations 
21. Id. at 5. 
22. Id. at 13.
23. J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How 
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
933, 948 (1997).
24. Id. (stating “[s]uch feedback loops can become exponential in effect and thus do-
minate the system in which they operate.”).
25. See Babcock, supra note 5, at 10-12 (discussing this phenomenon).
26. Ruhl, supra note 23, at 948.
27. Id.
28. This is best illustrated by the “butterfly effect,” in which the smallest change, like 
the wings of a butterfly “stirring the air today in a Chinese park can transform the storm 
systems appearing next month over a North American city.” DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S
ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 407 (Donald Worster & Alfred Crosby eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994) (1977) (explaining how “tiny differences in input might 
quickly become substantial differences in output.”).  
29. Alvin Toffler, Introduction to ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT
OF CHAOS: MAN’S NEW DIALOGUE WITH NATURE xvii (Bantam Books 1984).  
Fall, 2009] PARTICULARIZED INJURY 7   
that threaten its stability.”30 Ecosystems contain constantly fluc-
tuating subsystems. These fluctuations, either alone or in combi-
nation, may become sufficiently powerful as a result of positive 
feedback loops to shatter the system’s preexisting organization.31
This makes it impossible to predict the direction change will take, 
let alone whether the basic structure of the system will “disinte-
grate into ‘chaos’ or leap to a new, more differentiated, higher level 
of ‘order’ or organization.”32 It also makes it difficult to discern 
what the initial condition of the system was before the  
change occurred.33
Additionally, our understanding of how complex systems, like 
estuaries, behave is in flux. The common view fifty years ago was 
all ecosystems were moving towards homeostasis: the point at 
which the system was in perfect balance.34 Nature was seen as a 
“manageable system of simple, linear, rational order.”35 Today, 
ecologists view ecosystems as anything but stable; instead they are 
seen as being composed of constantly “shifting patterns in endless 
flux[.]”36 There are too many variables in these systems for scien-
tists “to plot all the lines of influence, of cause and effect[,]” be-
cause nature’s processes are “essentially non-linear.”37 Where ecol-
ogists once believed they could determine what level of disturbance 
was safe, today’s ecologists see “[e]ach organic system . . . [to be] so 
rich in feedbacks, homeostatic devices, and potential multiple 
pathways that a complete description is quite impossible.”38
The current standing paradigm assumes a natural system that 
is stable and unchanging, where harms can be isolated and parti-
cularized to individual plaintiffs. However, this understanding is 
seriously out-dated. It is now understood that natural systems, 
like estuaries, are stochastic and unstable and subject to the laws 
of complexity or chaos theory, where change, which can be set off 
by the smallest disturbances to these systems, is one of the few 
immutable rules, and phenomena like positive feedback loops can 
both reinforce and alter outcomes.   
30. ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAN’S NEW DI-
ALOGUE WITH NATURE 188 (Bantam Books 1984).
31. Toffler, supra note 29, at xv.
32. Id.
33. STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE LAWS OF 
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 23 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).  
34. WORSTER, supra note 28, at 366-67 (stating “the principle goal of the theory of 
ecosystem management was to achieve a ‘steady state,’ or equilibrium.”).  
35. Id. at 406. 
36. Id. at 412. 
37. Id. at 407.  
38. ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND 
INHERITANCE 59 (1982).  
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The complexity of the Bay’s structure also means a piecemeal 
approach to solving its problems, one discharge pipe or septic sys-
tem at a time, will not work. The attack on these problems needs 
to be broad-based and systemic, like the environmentalists’ lawsuit 
against EPA for failing to meet the Chesapeake Bay Agreement’s 
water quality goals. Furthermore, unless the courts act, the mul-
tiplicity of political jurisdictions contribute to the Bay’s problems 
and are responsible for their solution, making it highly unlikely 
any one of these stakeholders will suddenly voluntarily step for-
ward to rescue the Bay.39 They have not done so in over twenty 
years, and there is no reason to believe they will do so now.40
 The complexity of natural systems like estuaries thus 
creates a serious barrier to showing a particularized injury, which 
requires disaggregating isolated harms to the system. If individual 
harms cannot be isolated, then a prospective plaintiff cannot iden-
tify a discrete harm that has injured her. If, for example, scientists 
cannot untangle the relationship between nutrient loading and 
general water quality in the Bay, then how can a plaintiff show 
whether her injury from the Bay’s excess nutrient loadings is from 
the contribution of nutrients from upstream tributaries, the failure 
of the state to control leaking septic systems, the reluctance of 
dairy farmers to implement manure management controls, or from 
airborne deposition of nitrogen, let alone from a particular source? 
Yet, these are exactly the showings that are required under the 
Court’s current standing doctrine, which is discussed next. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT STANDING JURISPRUDENCE
 Standing is the hurdle all plaintiffs must surmount before a 
federal court will hear the merits of their claims.41 The elements of 
the Court’s standing doctrine are sufficiently well known that most 
law students can recite them from memory:  “[t]he plaintiff must 
39. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regu-
latory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003) (stating that when there is a mismatch between 
the underlying “social ills” and the existing political-legal regime, it is highly unlikely that 
any regulator or other interested party will step forward and try to solve the problem). 
40. See Id. at 36 (explaining that regulators and “those benefiting from the status 
quo” have little incentive to change it because they “have sunk money and effort” into main-
taining it and “are likely to become attached to it”).  
41. See generally Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environ-
mental Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 121 (2008); Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L.
REV. 221 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1505 (2008); Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus:  Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA, 23 
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73 (2008); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury 
to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); David M. Palmer, Untangling Tenth Amend-
ment Standing: Why Private Parties Cannot Enforce the Federal Structure, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 169 (2008). 
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have suffered an ‘injury-in fact,’” defined as “an invasion of a legal-
ly protected interest, which is (a) concrete and particularized, [ci-
tations omitted]; and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’ [citations omitted].”42 The injury must also be fairly 
traceable to the defendant’s challenged action and not “th[e] result 
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court[,]” and “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the 
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”43 The doctrine is 
not set out in the Constitution; rather it is inferred from Article 
III’s cases and controversies limitation on judicial authority44 to 
assure plaintiffs have a genuine interest and personal stake in  
a controversy. Additional common justifications given for the  
standing doctrine are separation of powers, judicial economy,  
and fairness.45
The judicial requirement that a plaintiff must be able to dem-
onstrate she has suffered an injury-in-fact is at the core of the 
standing doctrine. The additional adjectival requirements that the 
injury be “concrete” or reflect “a personal stake” in the underlying 
action and be actual or imminent exist to “assure that concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination[.]”46 The other two 
prongs of the Court’s standing doctrine, traceability and redressa-
bility, flow from these requirements. 
A. The Need to Show a Particularized Injury 
Standing has been problematic for many environmental plain-
tiffs because often the harms complained about cannot easily be 
reduced to a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact, which can then be 
traced to illegal governmental conduct and be redressed by a fa-
42. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
43. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (extends judicial review “to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . 
[and] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party[.]”) 
45. Palmer, supra note 41, at 177.  
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“[The] requirement [of concrete injury] is not just an empty formality. It 
preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the 
court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that ‘the legal ques-
tions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but 
in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of 
judicial action.’”); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998) (theoretical harms should be ad-
dressed by the political process, not the judicial process, to “prevent[ ] a plaintiff from ob-
taining . . . an advisory opinion.”). 
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vorable court decision.47 Another confounding feature of the stand-
ing doctrine is that environmental harms frequently affect the 
commons, in which “few, if any, have distinct and particularized 
legal interests.”48   
This article focuses on the need for an injury to be particula-
rized to an individual plaintiff, and thus distinguishable from inju-
ries suffered by other members of the public, because in many 
ways it can be the most problematic of the adjectives adorning the 
Court’s modern standing jurisprudence for environmental plain-
tiffs.49 The need to particularize injuries to a discrete plaintiff 
leads to a scramble by plaintiffs’ lawyers to find individuals with a 
personal connection to the harm complained about, thus reducing 
the Court’s standing doctrine to what Chief Justice Roberts re-
ferred to in Massachusetts as a “lawyer’s game.”50 The absurdity of 
this situation, as Professor Daniel Farber notes, is that while the 
government’s “regulatory actions will often create the requisite in-
jury in fact . . . in a given case an environmental organization may 
not be able to recruit the appropriate plaintiff” or the plaintiff’s 
burden will not be met because she has filed the wrong affidavits.51
The Court’s insistence that plaintiffs demonstrate a particula-
rized injury makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to bring a 
legal action to address the Bay’s broad-based problems. The plain-
tiffs cannot show the requisite particularized injury because the 
cause of their injury cannot be neatly unraveled into discrete prob-
lems. The indeterminacy and nonlinear character of the natural 
system described earlier preclude the identification of particula-
rized injuries. If these injuries cannot be particularized, then in 
the parlance of the standing doctrine this makes them generalized 
injuries, which are broadly felt by an undifferentiated regional  
or even national population and thus barred by the Court’s  
standing doctrine.52     
47. Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciabil-
ity, and Separation of Powers After Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 175,
181-82 (2008). 
48. Id. at 182. 
49. This is not to say that the other elements of injury-in-fact or the two other consti-
tutionally mandated prongs, traceability and redressability, are problem-free. The need to 
demonstrate that an injury is imminent drew Justice Scalia’s attention in Summers v. 
Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1150 (2009), where he criticized the affidavit filed by 
one environmental plaintiff because it discussed “past injury rather than imminent future 
injury that is sought to be enjoined.” 
50. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 n.24 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
51. Farber, supra note 41, at 1542. 
52. There is a distinction between widespread harms, which do not defeat the stand-
ing of an individual experiencing the same harm (see United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) (explaining that “standing is not 
to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury” because that “would mean 
that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody[ 
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife53 remains the Court’s strongest 
affirmation of the need to show a particularized injury.54 While 
Massachusetts rectified some of the more extreme elements of Jus-
tice Scalia’s standing analysis in Lujan, the opinion did not elimi-
nate the need for the harm to be one that directly affects the par-
ticular plaintiff.55 Indeed, the Court went to great lengths to show 
Massachusetts suffered a specific injury from global climate 
change–the loss of its coastline.56
In Lujan, Justice Scalia emphatically states a particularized 
injury-in-fact is part of the “irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing” and, therefore, cannot be modified.57 Justice Scalia is 
wrong for two reasons.  First, even if particularized injury is con-
stitutionally mandated, the Court has relaxed other elements of its 
standing requirements, as shown below, and there is no reason not 
to loosen this one as well. Second, the particularized injury re-
quirement is prudential, as is mootness, the political question doc-
trine, and the bar against third-party standing, and thus not con-
stitutionally required. 
B. Reasons to Relax the Particularized Injury Showing,  
Especially for Complex Evolving Ecosystems 
 First, if Justice Scalia is right, and particularized injury is 
constitutionally required, then it is hard to countenance the 
Court’s relaxed attitude toward the other elements of standing 
without including the need for an injury to be particularized. For 
]”)), and generalized harms where the plaintiff cannot distinguish her harm from that being 
suffered by others. Id. at 689 (stating that plaintiffs must have alleged “a specific and per-
ceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural 
resources that were claimed to be affected.”). 
53. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
54. Whether Summers will challenge Lujan for that title is open to question. See 
Noelle Straub, Experts Weigh Impact of High Court’s Forest Service Ruling, GREENWIRE,
Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/03/04/2. According to Professor 
Robert Fischman:  
It’s hard to know with this case [Summers] whether it represents a departure 
from what had been a broadening of standing over the last 10 years or whether 
this is going to be an anomaly . . . The standing aspect to the ruling just touches 
on so many topics and so much litigation that even though it’s not quite clear what 
it means, it’s of critical importance to hundreds of plaintiffs around the country. 
Id. 
55. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (explaining that “it is clear that petitioners’ 
submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards 
of the adversarial process.  EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’” (citing Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560)). 
56. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 (“Because the Commonwealth ‘owns a sub-
stantial portion of the state’s coastal property,’ . . . it has alleged a particularized injury in 
its capacity as a landowner.”) (internal citations omitted). 
57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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example, the Court has substantially lessened the plaintiff’s bur-
den to demonstrate traceability and redressability when prosecut-
ing some procedural right granted by Congress,58 like the right to 
require an agency to prepare an environmental impact statement 
under the National Environmental Policy Act. In Massachusetts,
the Court relaxed the need that an injury be imminent until the 
next century or longer.59 In Bennett v. Spear,60 the Court displayed 
a similarly relaxed attitude toward the zone-of-interest test, which 
was engrafted onto the injury-in-fact requirement in the last quar-
ter of the previous century,61 relaxing it in the context of a statuto-
ry citizen suit provision.  
If the Constitution mandates these standing requirements, 
then the Court must apply them to all injuries under all circums-
tances. Any exception based on a procedural or some other right 
appears more like “a creature of practical necessity” than constitu-
tional dogma and reveals the test’s “fundamental ineptitude . . . as 
a reasonable measure of constitutional standing in public law cas-
es.”62 Like the Pillsbury dough boy, the contours of the standing 
doctrine, including its most hallowed injury-in-fact component, ap-
pear infinitely malleable. If the Court can loosen these standing 
elements, then surely it can treat the requirement that an injury 
be particularized the same way. Loosening the particularized in-
jury test will hardly open the floodgates to litigation, considering 
that the concrete injury requirement adequately cabined the 
Court’s jurisdiction for years before the particularized requirement 
came into vogue. 
The second reason for the belief that the Court can relax the 
particularized injury test is that the obverse of a particularized
injury is a generalized one,63 and courts have long considered the 
bar against generalized injuries to be prudential.64 Because the bar 
58. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18; cf. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 
S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (“Only a ‘person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect 
his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy.’ . . . Unlike redressability, however, the requirement of injury 
in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”).. 
59. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522-23. 
60. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997) (saying that the “ESA’s citizen-suit 
provision . . . expands the zone of interests[ ].”). 
61. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (a per-
son has standing if her interest is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute[.]”). 
62. Brown, supra note 41, at 263-64. 
63. A typical example of a generalized injury is a taxpayer suit where the injury suf-
fered in the allegation is often minute and shared with millions of others, is indeterminable, 
and is a reflection of a public, not individual, concern. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Mass. v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). 
64. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (identifying the generalized griev-
ance bar as a prudential barrier). 
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against pleading generalized injuries is prudential, courts can and 
have relaxed it. Jonathan R. Nash identifies two such instances.65
The first involves the “[o]verbreadth doctrine,” which allows par-
ties to object to overbroad speech regulations, even when the regu-
lations do not infringe directly on their speech.66 The second exam-
ple Nash gives is a declaratory judgment where courts can declare 
broadly the rights and legal relations of any party seeking such 
relief regardless of whether the party has personally experienced 
the effect of the threatened action.67 In each instance, plaintiffs are 
raising broad-based public concerns; in neither case is the injury 
particularized to the plaintiff, nor will the effects of a positive rul-
ing from the court be limited to redressing just the injury to the 
particular plaintiff. 
The reason for barring generalized grievances is the same rea-
son for requiring particularized injuries–to prevent courts from 
breaching the barrier between the judicial branch and the other 
two branches of government.68 However, in the situation which has 
given rise to this article, that reason does not make sense. Precise-
ly because harms to complex natural systems like the Bay are 
widespread and shared by many, it is unlikely that the public will 
organize to pressure the government to abate them.69 Moreover, 
neither the government nor the public responds well to “ex ante” 
catastrophic risks, where the benefits of expenditures before the 
catastrophic event occurs appear less tangible than the present 
day costs of taking action to avert it.70 These social dynamics be-
come barriers to action, a dynamic afflicting the Bay, and allow the 
political branches of government to avoid acting. Lastly, the politi-
cal branches are not powerless to act before a court reaches the 
merits of a case and can thus preempt the lawsuit at any time be-
fore it must step in and resolve the dispute.  
Unless courts are willing to set aside the requirement that 
plaintiffs plead a particularized injury in the case of harms to 
complex natural systems like estuaries, and fill the vacuum left by 
the elected branches, those harms will continue unabated and, in 
the case of the Bay, will potentially magnify and become worse. If 
65. Jonathan R. Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
494, 518-19 (2008).   
66. Id. at 518. 
67. Id. at 518-19. 
68. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 33 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the 
bar against generalized grievances as preventing “‘something in the nature of an Athenian 
democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Govern-
ment by means of lawsuits in federal courts’”).  
69. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 28-29 (discussing how people faced with harm to a 
common pool resource are unlikely to take any initiative to protect it). 
70. Nash, supra note 65, at 520. 
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one agrees that the particularized injury requirement is pruden-
tial, or at least capable of modification like the other elements of 
standing, then it should be apparent that the Court can abandon 
or modify it in some situations.71 However, no court is likely to ab-
andon or modify the requirement without some limiting principles 
to curb the number and type of potential plaintiffs who might oth-
erwise flood the courts.  
IV. SOME PROPOSED LIMITING PRINCIPLES TO CONSTRAIN THE 
NUMBER AND TYPES OF CASES UNDER A MORE RELAXED
INJURY-IN-FACT STANDARD
In the final part of this article, four limiting principles are pro-
posed for consideration.   
The first principle limits the type of plaintiff who can qualify 
for a waiver of the need to show a particularized injury.72 This 
principle is similar to the Court’s prudential third party standing 
jurisprudence, where parties have sometimes been allowed to raise 
the concerns of others not before the court when the litigation 
would impact those other parties.73 One type of plaintiff who would 
qualify under this principle is someone who satisfies Daniel A. 
Farber’s place-based standing requirement.74 Place-based standing 
is the idea that plaintiffs with a special connection to the geo-
graphic area they are concerned about are uniquely qualified to 
prosecute matters affecting that area.75 Thus, the eponymous Che-
sapeake Bay Foundation, which is dedicated to the restoration and 
71. But, unlike the Court in Massachusetts, the author sees no reason to limit this 
proposed relaxation of the Court’s standing doctrine to states. The unusual vehemence and 
breadth of the Chief Justice’s attack on the majority’s analysis, including noting that there 
was no basis in the Court’s standing jurisprudence to carve out states for “special solicitude” 
raises at least the possibility that the dissenters envision the effect of the majority’s stand-
ing analysis to have a much broader impact than just on state plaintiffs. Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536-37 (2007). In a subsequent article, these and other reasons why the 
opinion should be applied more broadly will be developed. 
72. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of 
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655 (1998) (exploring the complexities of expanding 
standing as a way of enforcing the duties of charitable trusts and examining alternatives to 
doing that). 
73. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (stating that a bartender was “en-
titled to assert those concomitant rights of third parties that would be ‘diluted or adversely 
affected’ should her constitutional challenge fail and the statutes remain in force.”).  But see 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (denying standing to a doctor who challenged a sta-
tute on the ground that it would deprive plaintiffs of their lives without due process). 
74. See generally Farber, supra note 41. While Farber proposes replacing the injury-
in-fact test with a place-based theory of standing, it is merely suggested here as a limiting 
principle for allowing some generalized claims of injury. 
75. Id. at 1549 (stating that place-based standing recognizes that “humans are inti-
mately and deeply connected with their geographic surroundings, and therefore have  
legitimate cause for complaint about environmental violations that impact  
those surroundings.").
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protection of the Chesapeake Bay and devotes all of its resources 
and energies to that end, should be able to establish a concrete 
physical connection to the Bay. Even though the broader public in 
the Bay’s watershed may share the Foundation’s interest in a 
healthy Bay, the Foundation’s concrete connection to the Bay 
makes its harm from the Bay’s decline “more than the abstract  
injury to ideology that the Court has consistently rejected  
as nonjusticiable.”76
Another type of plaintiff who would not need to make a show-
ing of particularized injury would be an organization that pos-
sesses the commitment, expertise, agenda, and resources to prose-
cute the matter. For example, the National Audubon Society quali-
fies by each of these metrics to protect critically important bird 
habitats like the Rainwater Basin in Nebraska or the Prairie Po-
thole region of North Dakota, even though the organization may 
not be physically proximate to the resource. The principle recog-
nizes that only such groups have the expertise and resources ne-
cessary to contribute meaningfully to such litigation. This plaintiff 
finds its origins in Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Sierra Club v. 
Morton, where he argued for an “imaginative expansion of our tra-
ditional concepts of standing in order to enable an organization . . . 
[with] pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes and 
purposes in the area of the environment” to have standing to liti-
gate environmental issues.77 It is narrower, however, than Justice 
Douglas’ proposal, which would grant standing to speak for a nat-
ural resource, like a river, to anyone if she enjoyed some attribute 
of it.78
The second limiting principle focuses on the nature and impor-
tance of the resource that is the subject of litigation and on the 
failure of the elected branches of government to protect it. The 
elimination of the particularized injury requirement would only 
extend to litigation involving large, nationally or regionally impor-
tant ecosystems, like the Bay, the Everglades, or a migratory bird 
flyway, where the effect of government inaction risks catastrophic 
and/or irreversible harm.79 Thus, not every lawsuit would justify 
elimination of the particularized injury test, but only those involv-
76. Brown, supra note 41, at 277. 
77. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
78. See id. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “people who have a mea-
ningful relation to that body of water–whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a 
logger–must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are 
threatened with destruction.”). 
79. See Toffler, supra note 29, at xvii (describing how sometimes the smallest of  
disturbances can lead to wide systemic changes and even their collapse or  
complete restructuring).   
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ing resources of “unusual importance,”80 where the impacts are 
“diffuse, with effects that are insidious and imperceptible but dan-
gerously irreversible[,]”81 and where the elected branches of  
government have failed to act, as in the case of the Bay, or  
acted improperly. 
The third principle addresses the type of harm the litigation is 
trying to arrest or abate. Relief from the need to demonstrate a 
particularized injury would only be allowed when the lawsuit ad-
dresses broad-based systemic harms to those resources, from 
which discrete harms cannot be isolated. Lawsuits to protect se-
verable parts of these areas, like a specific wetland, would contin-
ue to be subject to a particularized injury standard, in part be-
cause the showing could be made.82 The same would go for suits 
filed against individual violators of various environmental laws, 
even if the violation involves a much larger resource, so long as the 
claim did not rest on disaggregating an individual injury from a 
much larger systemic harm.   
Both the second and third principles address situations in 
which, consistent with the concept of separation of powers, the 
judicial branch is expected to step in and correct a situation where 
the executive branch has failed to implement a directive from the 
legislative branch to the detriment of the people. In neither case 
are courts being asked to develop programs to protect these sys-
tems, as they clearly lack the competence to do this. Rather, courts 
are being asked to interpret whether existing law requires some 
form of government action–“a question eminently suitable to reso-
lution in federal court.”83
80. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 (2007). This principle elicited the most 
comments from Florida State University College of Law faculty after my lecture, illustrating 
a justifiable level of concern about the vagueness of the proposal and its capacity for abuse.  
Several of these comments suggested ways in which the proposal could become less vague, 
such as proposing that resources of importance be identified through a process similar to the 
listing of wetlands of international significance under Ramsar or by having plaintiffs dem-
onstrate the significance of the resource and the failure of the government to protect it.  
Either of these might work, so long as they do not add to the burden plaintiffs already bear 
to meet the remaining standing prongs. A possible way to identify important resources that 
would avoid increasing plaintiffs’ burden is to include in the principle only those resources 
the importance of which Congress has recognized directly, such as through the Great Lakes 
Program in section 118 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 126, or through the National 
Estuary Program under section 320 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1330. Developing 
any of these ideas further, however, is beyond the scope of this article and must be saved for 
another day. 
81. Brown, supra note 41, at 279-80. 
82. The author is not arguing here that these more confined lawsuits, such as suits to 
stop the filling of a wetland or to stop an unpermitted discharger, should not be brought. 
The author is only asserting that, by themselves, they cannot address the systemic problems 
of larger resources.  
83. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516.   
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The final limiting principle derives from the means by which a 
plaintiff seeks relief from a court. Under this principle, waivers of 
the particularized injury test would be restricted to claims brought 
under statutory citizen suit authority.84 This proposal piggybacks 
on the majority’s reasoning in Massachusetts that when Congress 
has authorized the filing of a legal action to protect some right or 
entitlement, some elements of injury-in-fact can be relaxed.85 That 
reasoning is simply extended to the need to show a particularized 
injury. One reason for this approach is that citizen suit provisions 
contain their own limiting principles, offering additional con-
straints on the number and type of suits that can be brought.86 For 
example, plaintiffs can only sue a federal agency for some failure 
to perform a mandatory duty when their claim has not been 
preempted by subsequent agency action, where the plaintiffs have 
complied with various jurisdictional prerequisites, and where the 
violation is ongoing. 
There is a risk that the factual burden of meeting these limit-
ing principles, especially the first one, could be as onerous as what 
plaintiffs currently face under the particularized injury require-
ment; however a simple declaration will be all that is necessary to 
establish either the specific place-based connection or the organi-
zational qualifications to prosecute the matter. There is also a risk 
that the nature of the litigation, compelling agency action unrea-
sonably withheld, invites the courts into micromanaging agency 
behavior. But courts do this every time they put an agency on a 
compliance schedule for failing to meet some mandatory duty, or, 
as the Court did in Massachusetts, demand that an agency give a 
reasoned explanation for its inaction. 
84. This limitation means that place-based or otherwise qualified groups suing to pro-
tect some resource from harm under the many natural resources and public land laws, such 
as the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et. seq., or the Federal Land Policy & Management 
Act 43 U.S.C. §1701 et. seq., which contain no citizen suit provisions, would still have to 
show particularized injury.  
85. There seems to be some disagreement among the Justices in Summers over the 
extent to which Congress can loosen the constitutionally mandated standing prongs. See 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (stating that Congress “can 
loosen the strictures of the redressability prong[,]” but not the requirement to show a con-
crete injury); Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that the “case would present 
different considerations if Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury” and 
had identified or conferred “some interest separate and apart from a procedural right,” 
where no case or controversy had existed before); Id. at 1154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing a hypothetical statute which expressly permits environmental groups to bring cases 
like the one before the court, and saying that since “[t]he majority cannot, and does not, 
claim that such a statute would be unconstitutional[,] . . .  [h]ow then can it find the present 
case constitutionally unauthorized?”). 
86. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2008) (precluding citizen suits where plaintiffs have 
failed to file a 60-day notice letter or where the government has already initiated an en-
forcement action against the alleged violator). 
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There is another risk, however, that is more serious. By con-
tinuing to demand “particularized proof” of a plaintiff’s injury, the 
Court guarantees the judicial branch will not fill the gap left by 
the other two branches when it comes to protecting fragile and 
complex ecosystems from broad-based systemic harms. Private lit-
igation to stem the loss of biodiversity at a regional, let alone na-
tional or global, level, such as the disappearance of Neotropical 
birds from North American flyways and the plunge in stocks of 
straddling fish, will fail. Instead, environmental plaintiffs will be 
restricted to discrete, less effective challenges to individual permit 
violations or to government actions that affect some small part of a 
larger ecosystem.  
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the Massachusetts’s Court’s sophisticated understand-
ing of how complex natural systems work and how human interac-
tions with them can have diffuse, often delayed, impacts, Massa-
chusetts illustrates the tenacity of the particularized injury test. 
The lengths to which the majority went to find a particularized 
harm to Massachusetts from global climate change underscores 
the poverty of the requirement, making the Court’s effort seem  
like a return to what Blackmun feared in Lujan–“code- 
pleading formalism.”87   
It seems that the Court needs a way out of the box in which 
Justice Scalia has placed it.88 This article has tried to respond to 
this need by suggesting why the particularized injury requirement 
should be loosened in certain limited situations. In support of this 
idea, the features of large, complex natural systems, like the Che-
sapeake Bay, that make it impossible for plaintiffs to show a parti-
cularized injury have been identified. The author has argued that 
the Court has had a relaxed attitude towards various elements of 
the standing doctrine, and therefore the need to show a particula-
rized injury could as well be relaxed because it is more akin to the 
prudential standing doctrine than to a strict constitutional re-
quirement. The author recognizes that this proposal, should it be 
taken up by any litigant, has an extremely low chance of success 
on the current Court. Nonetheless, the risk of trying and failing 
are more than offset by the environmental harm of continuing the 
status quo.  
87. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 593 (1992) (Blackmun,  
J., dissenting).  
88. The continuing divisiveness on the Court over the contours of the standing doc-
trine and its use to block consideration of the merits of certain controversies, as illustrated 
most recently by Summers, seems proof positive of this conclusion. 
